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	<title>Comments on: Reforming CEO Compensation</title>
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	<link>http://www.manasclerk.com/blog/2008/10/16/reforming-ceo-compensation/</link>
	<description>Because the killer app is us.</description>
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		<title>By: Al Gorman</title>
		<link>http://www.manasclerk.com/blog/2008/10/16/reforming-ceo-compensation/#comment-29433</link>
		<dc:creator>Al Gorman</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 30 Oct 2008 13:49:49 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.manasclerk.com/blog/?p=597#comment-29433</guid>
		<description>Your point regarding the number of individuals currently invested in the markets is central to the dilemma. If we consider that 80% of the general population possess discretionary time spans less than one year how does a CEO get focused on the long term? Mutual fund managers are pressured to deliver positive quarterly returns quarter after quarter to maintain and increase their fee base. When mutual funds first emerged as an investment vehicle for the masses they had penalty clauses for early withdrawl. This was a deterent to short term liquidation. As the market grew competitors removed these early withdrawal clauses from their portfolios and as a consequence there was no deterent to pulling one&#039;s equity out of the fund. The simple fact is the average investor is not very sophisticated and as a result the markets today are rarely fuelled by fundamentals but run on hype. CEOs as a consequence are forced to stay focused on short term results versus creating longer term value where the short term results would not appear competitve. Warren Buffett would appear to have addressed this by squeezing out many mass investors because of the entry price associated with Berkshire shares. CEOs would appear to understand that their opportunities are limited to the short term and the investor mentality with respect to company executives is you get to eat what you kill thus they seize these short term opportunities to line their own pockets. In order to alter the effectiveness of governance in these companies one needs to alter the perceptions and understanding of the average investor. Good luck! In the meantime executives will continue to exploit the widely held expectations of the average market investor and their fund managers.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Your point regarding the number of individuals currently invested in the markets is central to the dilemma. If we consider that 80% of the general population possess discretionary time spans less than one year how does a CEO get focused on the long term? Mutual fund managers are pressured to deliver positive quarterly returns quarter after quarter to maintain and increase their fee base. When mutual funds first emerged as an investment vehicle for the masses they had penalty clauses for early withdrawl. This was a deterent to short term liquidation. As the market grew competitors removed these early withdrawal clauses from their portfolios and as a consequence there was no deterent to pulling one&#8217;s equity out of the fund. The simple fact is the average investor is not very sophisticated and as a result the markets today are rarely fuelled by fundamentals but run on hype. CEOs as a consequence are forced to stay focused on short term results versus creating longer term value where the short term results would not appear competitve. Warren Buffett would appear to have addressed this by squeezing out many mass investors because of the entry price associated with Berkshire shares. CEOs would appear to understand that their opportunities are limited to the short term and the investor mentality with respect to company executives is you get to eat what you kill thus they seize these short term opportunities to line their own pockets. In order to alter the effectiveness of governance in these companies one needs to alter the perceptions and understanding of the average investor. Good luck! In the meantime executives will continue to exploit the widely held expectations of the average market investor and their fund managers.</p>
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		<title>By: Forrest Christian</title>
		<link>http://www.manasclerk.com/blog/2008/10/16/reforming-ceo-compensation/#comment-29432</link>
		<dc:creator>Forrest Christian</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 22 Oct 2008 16:11:21 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.manasclerk.com/blog/?p=597#comment-29432</guid>
		<description>Greed is always there. You should always design systems to use base emotions to balance base emotions. It helps to keep borderline personalities in check.
There will never be a good answer because long term results must always be in tension with near-term results. It is a delicate tension and not a balance. The problem is that the short-term has overpowered all other ideas.
I think that some of this may be due to the fact that so many people are in the stock markets, at least in America. Our retirements are almost entirely market driven, and many people have investment portfolios.
Tie to this a couple of facts about human nature. As that great philosopher, &lt;a href=&quot;http://baseballhall.org/hof/anderson-sparky&quot;&gt;George Anderson&lt;/a&gt;, once said, &quot;losing hurts twice and much as winning feels good.&quot; (Or &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/08/magazine/the-way-we-live-now-6-8-03-crash-course-prospect-theory.html&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;Prospect Theory&lt;/a&gt;, if you like academics.) Then there&#039;s the problem of seeing your neighbor get richer when you don&#039;t. (It also has a cute name which I have forgotten.)
I&#039;m not sure what the solution will be, but it should involve some form of internal checks and balances. Perhaps letting investors choose short or long term, with long-term investors getting subsidy from the government in the form of tax incentives. You need both sides to be powerful and to constantly be battling each other.
The problem for Jaquesians is that the issue isn&#039;t really a problem of the MAH but of the Association of shareholders.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Greed is always there. You should always design systems to use base emotions to balance base emotions. It helps to keep borderline personalities in check.</p>
<p>There will never be a good answer because long term results must always be in tension with near-term results. It is a delicate tension and not a balance. The problem is that the short-term has overpowered all other ideas.</p>
<p>I think that some of this may be due to the fact that so many people are in the stock markets, at least in America. Our retirements are almost entirely market driven, and many people have investment portfolios.</p>
<p>Tie to this a couple of facts about human nature. As that great philosopher, <a href="http://baseballhall.org/hof/anderson-sparky">George Anderson</a>, once said, &#8220;losing hurts twice and much as winning feels good.&#8221; (Or <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/08/magazine/the-way-we-live-now-6-8-03-crash-course-prospect-theory.html">Prospect Theory</a>, if you like academics.) Then there&#8217;s the problem of seeing your neighbor get richer when you don&#8217;t. (It also has a cute name which I have forgotten.)</p>
<p>I&#8217;m not sure what the solution will be, but it should involve some form of internal checks and balances. Perhaps letting investors choose short or long term, with long-term investors getting subsidy from the government in the form of tax incentives. You need both sides to be powerful and to constantly be battling each other.</p>
<p>The problem for Jaquesians is that the issue isn&#8217;t really a problem of the MAH but of the Association of shareholders.</p>
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		<title>By: Jack Fallow</title>
		<link>http://www.manasclerk.com/blog/2008/10/16/reforming-ceo-compensation/#comment-29431</link>
		<dc:creator>Jack Fallow</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 21 Oct 2008 14:47:05 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.manasclerk.com/blog/?p=597#comment-29431</guid>
		<description>Having set senior salaries (or at least advised on them inside companies) it seems to me that there are many pitfalls. It is easy to get the level wrong, just as Mark Van Clieaf has been suggesting.
However, many senior officers never see the output from their strategic interventions.  They want to plan for the long term but get measured by fund managers on the quarterly/annual cycle.
So Executives are required to play a game that is driven not by their own the bonus performance but that of actors who are employed by others. ie fund managers.  And, because of competition between fund mangers, and the willingness of investors to move to the most recently successful fund manager, each fund manager wants to be top of the WM league tables.  So, each fund manager is under pressure to chase the near short term numbers rather than the long term numbers!
I believe ( actually I know) that many folk in banks were aware of the impending doom, but not its timing.  However, they had to produce the dividends that their competitors were producing to maintain market share and got involved.
Of course, it can be argued that a good company chairman might help the &#039;Wall Street&#039; folk understand why their particular company is pursuing a different approach.  But not many can, and few do with any success.  And if they do not produce the dividends.......
So, is this current situation just a set of examples of the natural tensions that exist in capitalism.  Energies can shift from satisfying a customer to exploiting an opportunity.  Maximising is easily mistaken for optimising.   Globalism of communications is mistaken for globalisation of trade and finance.  Managers just focus on Economy (level 1)
Efficiency (level 2)
and forget that the whole system requires Effectiveness, Emergence and Evolution.
Or is it just greed?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Having set senior salaries (or at least advised on them inside companies) it seems to me that there are many pitfalls. It is easy to get the level wrong, just as Mark Van Clieaf has been suggesting.</p>
<p>However, many senior officers never see the output from their strategic interventions.  They want to plan for the long term but get measured by fund managers on the quarterly/annual cycle.</p>
<p>So Executives are required to play a game that is driven not by their own the bonus performance but that of actors who are employed by others. ie fund managers.  And, because of competition between fund mangers, and the willingness of investors to move to the most recently successful fund manager, each fund manager wants to be top of the WM league tables.  So, each fund manager is under pressure to chase the near short term numbers rather than the long term numbers!</p>
<p>I believe ( actually I know) that many folk in banks were aware of the impending doom, but not its timing.  However, they had to produce the dividends that their competitors were producing to maintain market share and got involved.</p>
<p>Of course, it can be argued that a good company chairman might help the &#8216;Wall Street&#8217; folk understand why their particular company is pursuing a different approach.  But not many can, and few do with any success.  And if they do not produce the dividends&#8230;&#8230;.</p>
<p>So, is this current situation just a set of examples of the natural tensions that exist in capitalism.  Energies can shift from satisfying a customer to exploiting an opportunity.  Maximising is easily mistaken for optimising.   Globalism of communications is mistaken for globalisation of trade and finance.  Managers just focus on Economy (level 1)<br />
Efficiency (level 2)<br />
and forget that the whole system requires Effectiveness, Emergence and Evolution.</p>
<p>Or is it just greed?</p>
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